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Abstract
In this paper we consider spanning tree problems, where n players want to be con-
nected to a source as cheap as possible. We introduce and analyze (n!) vertex oriented
construct and charge procedures for such spanning tree situations leading in n steps
to a minimum cost spanning tree and a cost sharing where each player pays the edge
which he chooses in the procedure. The main result of the paper is that the average
of the n! cost sharings provided by our procedure is equal to the P-value for minimum
cost spanning tree situations introduced and characterized by Branzei et al. (2004).
As a side product, we ﬁnd a new method, the vertex oriented procedure, to construct
minimum cost spanning trees.
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Consider a group of agents that needs to be connected directly or via other agents to a unique
supplier of a source. Assume that the construction of the links is costly. Then, the ﬁrst
important question is how to ﬁnd the cheapest set of links that will connect each agent to
the source. This question constitutes one of the most well-known problems of combinatorial
optimization: the minimum cost spanning tree (mcst) problem. The operations research
literature on mcst problems has provided many algorithmic solutions to the problem and has
discussed the computational properties of these solutions. We can mention, for example, the
two most famous algorithms, the Kruskal algorithm (Kruskal,1956) and the Prim algorithm
(Prim, 1957). An historic overview of the algorithms provided for the mcst problem can be
found in Graham and Hell (1985).
If the cost of the construction is to be covered by the agents, the second important
question that arises in mcst situations is how to allocate the cost of the mcst among the
agents in a fair way. This cost allocation problem is introduced in the economics literature
by Claus and Kleitman (1973). The seminal paper by Bird (1976) provided the ﬁrst game
theoretical treatment of this problem by associating a coalitional game with transferable
utility to mcst problems. Then, solution concepts of cooperative game theory are imple-
mented in this game and proposed as appropriate cost allocations for mcst problems by
several studies: Granot and Huberman (1981,1984) analyzed the core and the nucleolus;
Kar (2002) studied the Shapley value of this game. Recently, Berganti˜ nos and Vidal-Puga
(2007) associated another coalitional game with mcst problems and studied the Shapley
value.
However, cost allocation rules for mcst problems can also be deﬁned directly without
appealing to the underlying cost game. In particular, one can make use of an algorithm to
construct a mcst and allocate the cost of each edge constructed by the algorithm among
the agents by following an appropriate method. Cost allocation rules which follow such a
procedure are called construct and charge rules in Moretti et al. (2005). Construct and
charge rules proposed in the literature mainly focus on the two well-known algorithms, the
Kruskal algorithm and the Prim algorithm, in order to construct a mcst: In particular, the
Bird rule (Bird, 1976) and the extended Bird rule (Dutta and Kar, 2004) rely on the Prim
algorithm while the P-value (Branzei et al., 2004), the equal remaining obligations rule
(Feltkamp et al., 1994a,b) and the obligation rules (Tijs et al., 2006) rely on the Kruskal
algorithm.
In this paper we consider a new construct and charge procedure, which we call the vertex
oriented construct and charge procedure, for spanning tree situations leading to a mcst and
a cost sharing where each player pays the edge which he chooses in the procedure. Consider
mcst problems, where n players 1,...,n want to be connected to a source 0 as cheap as
possible. Given an ordering σ = (σ(1),σ(2),...,σ(n)) of the players the n-step procedure is
as follows. In step 1 player σ(1) connects with one of the vertices 0,σ(2),...,σ(n) in a way
1as cheap as possible. Assume that in the steps 1,2,...,k already a forest is constructed by
the players σ(1),...,σ(k) with k edges. Then, player σ(k + 1) belongs to one of the trees
of this forest and has to construct an edge as cheap as possible avoiding a cycle starting
from a point of the tree to which he belongs. It turns out that this procedure indeed leads
to a mcst. Let us clarify the situation with an example where 3 players 1,2,3 want to be
connected directly or indirectly with a source 0 and where the cost situation is represented








Figure 1: An mcst situation with three agents
cheapest of the edges (1,0),(1,2),(1,3) which is edge (1,2) with cost 40. Then player 2
constructs and pays edge (1,3) with cost 60 and this is the cheapest of his allowed edges
(2,0),(2,3),(1,0),(1,3). Finally player 3 chooses edge (1,0) which is the cheapest of his
allowed edges (3,0),(1,0),(2,0). Note that (3,2) is not allowed for player 3 because it
generates a cycle. The result is the mcst with edges (1,2),(1,3),(1,0) and the cost share
vector (40,60,90). In the next table we see the construct and charge results for all orderings
of the players.
Constructed edges by Costs for
σ 1 2 3 1 2 3
(1,2,3) (1,2) (1,3) (1,0) 40 60 90
(1,3,2) (1,2) (1,0) (1,3) 40 90 60
(2,1,3) (1,3) (1,2) (1,0) 60 40 90
(2,3,1) (1,0) (1,2) (1,3) 90 40 60
(3,1,2) (1,2) (1,0) (1,3) 40 90 60
(3,2,1) (1,0) (1,2) (1,3) 90 40 60
Table 1: Construct and charge results for the mcst situation in Figure 1
The vertex oriented construct and charge procedure provides a cost allocation for each
ordering of the players. However, the cost allocation provided by our procedure for a
particular ordering of the players can be considered as unfair, since the right to construct an
edge between two players is ﬁrst given to the one which precedes the other in the ordering.
A typical method of achieving fairness for the allocations depending on the ordering of
players is averaging the allocations over the set of all orderings. Hence, we focus on the
2V -value, the average of the cost allocations provided by the vertex oriented procedure over
the set of all orderings of players. The main result of our study is that the V -value is equal
to the P-value for mcst situations introduced and characterized by Branzei et al. (2004). 1
The vertex oriented construct and charge procedure gives a new method to construct
mcst’s. Hence, we will now try to provide a brief comparison of the vertex oriented construct
and charge procedure with the Prim and the Kruskal algorithms and with construct and
charge rules relying on these algorithms. The Prim algorithm can be described as follows:
In every iteration of the Prim algorithm, a player who is not connected yet with the source
constructs an edge between herself and either the source or another player which is already
connected with the source in the previous iterations of the algorithm. Hence, the Prim
algorithm is also vertex oriented. Moreover, similar to our algorithm, every player has
the right to construct the cheapest allowed edge. But, the main diﬀerence is that the set
of edges allowed for construction by the Prim algorithm is restricted to the ones which
provide a connection with the source. The Bird rule assigns the cost of an edge constructed
in some iteration of the Prim algorithm to the player which constructs that edge and gets
a connection with the source in that same iteration. For example, in the mcst problem
represented in Figure 1, player 1 constructs and pays the edge (1,0) with cost 90 according to
the Bird rule because player 1 has the cheapest direct connection with the source. However,
player 1 is adjacent to all the edges contained in the unique mcst of the problem and the
edge (1,0) is the most expensive one among these edges. From this aspect, the Bird rule
can be considered as unfair. A similar unfairness argument holds for the generalization of
the Bird rule to mcst problems involving more than one mcst’s provided by Dutta and Kar
(2004).
The Kruskal algorithm selects and adds edges to the spanning tree in increasing order of
their costs such that an edge is added only if it does not create a cycle with the previously
added edges. Hence, the Kruskal algorithm is an edge oriented algorithm. In other words,
the decision on the construction of an edge is taken by the researcher in the Kruskal algo-
rithm. In the vertex oriented construct and charge procedure and in the Prim algorithm,
this decision is left to the players. Construct and charge rules relying on the Kruskal algo-
rithm specify what fraction of the cost an edge constructed by the Kruskal algorithm will
be paid by each player. However, the V -value determines these fractions by averaging the
cost allocations corresponding to the orderings of the players.
The outline of the paper is as follows. Section 2 provides some elementary graph theo-
retical deﬁnitions and deﬁnes mcst problems and the P-value formally. Section 3 formally
introduces the vertex oriented construct and charge procedure and presents two prelimi-
nary results. In Section 4, we prove the coincidence of the V -value with the P-value. We
conclude in Section 5.
1The P-value coincides with the Equal Remaining Obligations rule which has been introduced in Feltkamp
et al. (1994) for minimum cost spanning extension problems.
32 Preliminaries
An (undirected) graph G is an ordered pair  V,E , where V = V (G) is a nonempty and
ﬁnite set of vertices and E = E(G) is a set of edges {i,j} with i,j ∈ V,i  = j. The complete
graph on a set V of vertices is the graph  V,EV  , where EV = {{i,j}|i,j ∈ V,i  = j}. A walk
between vertices i and j in a graph G =  V,E  is a sequence of vertices i = i0,i1,...,ik =
j,k ≥ 1, such that {is,is+1} ∈ E for each s ∈ {0,...,k − 1}. A path between vertices i and
j in a graph G is a walk between vertices i and j in which all edges are distinct. A cycle in
G is a path from i to i for some i ∈ V . Two nodes i,j ∈ V are said to be connected in G if
i = j or if there exists a path between i and j in G. G is called connected if, for all i,j ∈ V ,
G contains a path between i and j. Given a path P = (i0,i1,...,ik) between vertices i and j
in graph G, we say that an edge {u,v} ∈ E is on path P if there exists m ∈ {0,1,...,k −1}
such that u = im and v = im+1 or v = im and u = im+1. For any graph G =  V,E  which
does not contain any cycles and for vertices i,j ∈ V which are connected in G, the unique
path between i and j in G is denoted by PG(i,j). With an abuse of notation, we denote
the set of edges on path PG(i,j) by PG(i,j), too.
A subgraph of G =  V,E  is a graph G′ =  V ′,E′  with V ′ ⊂ V (V ′  = ∅) and E′ ⊂ E.





E|V ′ = {{u,v} ∈ E|u ∈ V ′ and v ∈ V ′}. A component G′ of G is a maximally connected
subgraph of G, i.e., G′ is the only connected subgraph of G containing G′ as a subgraph.
The component of a graph G which contains vertex i is denoted by Ci(G). A connected
graph which does not contain any cycles is called a tree. A subgraph G′ =  V ′,E′  of G is
called a spanning tree in G if it is a tree with V ′ = V . We denote the set of spanning trees
of  V,E  by Γ V,E .
In this paper we consider mcst situations in which a group of agents is willing to be
connected to a supplier of a service (source) as cheap as possible. Every mcst situation can
be represented by a tuple  V,EV ,w , where  V,EV   is a complete graph on V = {0,1,...,n}
which is the union of the agent set N = {1,...,n} and the source 0 to be connected. The
function w : EV → R+ is called a weight function and associates with each edge e ∈ EV
the weight w(e) which represents the cost of constructing e. Obviously, the minimum cost
network that would connect all the agents to the source has to form a spanning tree of
 V,EV  . Because, if this is not the case, then the network contains a cycle and removal of
any link from this cycle will result in a cheaper network which still connects every agent
to the source. Therefore, given a mcst problem  V,EV ,w , we are interested in ﬁnding a
spanning tree of  V,E  with minimal cost, i.e., a minimum cost spanning tree of  V,E .
Formally, the cost of a spanning tree, Γ is given by c(Γ) =
 
e∈E(Γ) w(e) and Γ is called a
mcst if it satisﬁes c(Γ) = minΓ′∈Γ V,E  c(Γ′).
Observe that an mcst situation with agent set N,  V,EV ,w , can be identiﬁed with the




4We will use the following well-known results in graph theory about trees.
Theorem 2.1 Let  V,EV ,w  be a mcst situation.
(1) (Gondran and Minoux, 1984, Property 2, p.132) Let Γ be a subgraph of  V,EV  .
Then, Γ is a spanning tree of  V,EV   if and only if Γ has |V |−1 edges and does not contain
any cycle.
(2) (Gondran and Minoux, 1984, Theorem 4, p.137) A spanning tree Γ of  V,EV   is
minimal if and only if w(e) ≥ w(f) for every e ∈ EV \E(Γ) and every f ∈ PΓ(e).
2.1 The P-value for Cost Sharing in mcst Situations
Each mcst situation involves the construction of a mcst as well as the allocation of the cost
of the mcst among its users in a fair way. Branzei, Moretti, Norde and Tijs (2004) introduce
and characterize the P-value to solve the cost sharing problem in mcst situations. The P-
value makes use of the Kruskal algorithm in order to construct a mcst. In the following, we
will provide the notation and the deﬁnitions required to introduce the P-value.
Let Π(EV ) stand for the set of all bijections π : {1,...,|EV |} → EV . Obviously, for
each mcst situation  V,EV ,w , there exists a bijection π ∈ Π(EV ) that orders the edges
in increasing order with respect to their costs, i.e., w(π(1)) ≤ w(π(2)) ≤ ... ≤ w(π(|EV |)).
The column vector (w(π(1)),w(π(2)),...,w(π(|EV |)))t is denoted by wπ.
For any π ∈ Π(EV ), one can deﬁne the set Kπ = {w ∈ R
EV
+ |w(π(1)) ≤ w(π(2)) ≤ ... ≤
w(π(|EV |))}, i.e., the set of weight functions which result in the same increasing order on
the set of edges with respect to their costs. It can easily be observed that Kπ is a cone
in R
EV
+ which is called in Branzei et al. (2004) as the Kruskal cone with respect to π.
Obviously,
 
π∈Π(EV ) Kπ = R
EV
+ = WV .
Branzei et al. (2004) introduce the P-value in two steps. First a value Pπ is deﬁned
on each cone Kπ (π ∈ Π(EV )) and then it is proved that these Pπ-values can be patched
together to the whole cone of mcst situations.
Let  V,EV ,w  be an mcst situation and π ∈ Π(EV ) be such that w ∈ Kπ. In order to
deﬁne the Pπ-value on Kπ, we will consider the Kruskal algorithm when it selects the edges
with respect to order π. The Pπ-value distributes the cost of the edges that are constructed
by the Kruskal algorithm among the agents whose connectivity, i.e., the number of nodes
in N that an agent is connected, increases with the construction of the edge. To do so,
we will consider a sequence of |EV |+1 graphs:  V,Fπ,0 , V,Fπ,1 ,..., V,Fπ,|EV |  such that
Fπ,0 = ∅ and Fπ,k = Fπ,k−1 ∪ {π(k)} for every k ∈ {1,...,|EV |}. The connectivity of an
agent i in  V,Fπ,k  is denoted by ni(Fπ,k). Note that ni(Fπ,k) = 1 when i is not connected
to any other agent in N in  V,Fπ,k . The Pπ-value will distribute the cost of a Kruskal edge
proportionally to the change in the connection vectors resulting from the introduction of the










for each i ∈ N.
The contribution matrix with respect to π ∈ Π(EV ) is the matrix Mπ ∈ RN×EV where
the rows correspond to the agents and the colums to the edges. It lists the change in the
connectivity of the agents, i.e., the k-th column of Mπ equals
Mπek = bπ,k−1 − bπ,k (2)
for each k ∈ {1,...,|EV |}. Here ek stands for the column vector such that ek
i = 1 if i = k
and ek
i = 0 for each i ∈ {1,...,|EV |}\{k}.
Example 2.1 Consider the mcst situation  V,EV ,w  with V = {0,1,2,3} and w as de-
picted in Figure 1. w ∈ Kπ, with π(1) = {1,2}, π(2) = {1,3}, π(3) = {2,3}, π(4) = {0,1},
π(5) = {0,3} and π(6) = {0,2}.
The sequence of the graphs  V,Fπ,k  formed by Kruskal algorithm and the corresponding
connection vectors are given in the table below.
 V,∅  bπ,0 = (1,1,1)t
 V,{{1,2}}  bπ,1 = (1
2, 1
2,1)t








 V,{{1,2},{1,3},{2,3},{0,1}}  bπ,4 = (0,0,0)t
 V,{{1,2},{1,3},{2,3},{0,1},{0,3}}  bπ,5 = (0,0,0)t
 V,{{1,2},{1,3},{2,3},{0,1},{0,3},{0,2}}  bπ,6 = (0,0,0)t






















Observe that the zero columns in Mπ correspond to the edges which are rejected in
the Kruskal algorithm. Moreover, each column Mπek with (Mπek)i  = 0 for some i ∈ N
corresponds to the edge π(k) constructed at stage k in the Kruskal algorithm. Notice that
the sum of the elements of such a column equals 1. Then, (Mπek)i (i ∈ N), the diﬀerence
between i’s connectivity resulting from the construction of π(k), represents the fraction of
the cost of the edge π(k) to be paid by agent i.
We are now ready to deﬁne the Pπ-value on Kπ. For each π ∈ Π(EV ), the Pπ-value is
deﬁned as the map Pπ : Kπ → RN, where Pπ(w) = Mπwπ for each mcst situation w in the
cone Kπ.
6Branzei et al. (2004) show that it is possible to patch these Pπ-values by the help of
the following lemma. We include the proof for the sake of completeness.
Lemma 2.1 Let π ∈ Π(EV ), w ∈ Kπ. Assume that wπ
t = wπ
t+1 for some t ∈ {1,...,|EV | −
1}. Then for the ordering π′ ∈ Π(EV ) such that π′(t) = π(t + 1),π′(t + 1) = π(t) and
π′(i) = π(i) for every i ∈ {1,...,|EV |}\{t,t+1}, we have that w ∈ Kπ′
and Pπ(w) = Pπ′
(w).
Proof. It is obvious that w ∈ Kπ′
. Put a = wπ
t . Note that bπ,k = bπ′,k for all k ∈
{1,...,|EV |}\{t}. Hence, wπ
kMπek = wπ′
k Mπ′






= a(bπ′,t−1 − bπ′,t) + a(bπ′,t − bπ′,t+1)
= a(bπ′,t−1 − bπ′,t+1) = a(bπ,t−1 − bπ,t+1) (3)
= a(bπ,t−1 − bπ,t) + a(bπ,t − bπ,t+1)
= wπ
t Mπet + wπ
t+1Mπet+1.
So, Mπwπ = Mπ′
wπ′
and hence, Pπ(w) = Pπ′
(w). ￿
Notice that the allocation of the cost of a single edge by the P-value may change with
the order on the set of edges constructed by the Kruskal algorithm. However, Lemma 2.1, as
can easily be seen from equality (3), implies that the P-value allocates the cost of the edges
which have the same cost in the same way independent of the order considered. Hence,
for every order that a weight function is compatible with, the P-value results in the same
allocation. This is stated in the following proposition.
Proposition 2.1 If w ∈ Kπ ∩ Kπ′
with π,π′ ∈ Π(EV ), then Pπ(w) = Pπ′
(w).
Finally, the P-value is deﬁned as the map P : WV → RN, where
P(w) = Pπ(w) = Mπwπ (4)
for every w ∈ WV and π ∈ Π(EV ) such that w ∈ Kπ.
Example 2.2 Consider the mcst situation in Example 2.1. wπ = (40,60,70,90,100,150)t.
Hence, P(w) = Mπwπ = (60,60,70)t. ⋄
3 The Vertex Oriented Construct and Charge Procedure
In this section, we ﬁrst provide the formal deﬁnition of the vertex oriented procedure which
we call the V -algorithm. Then, we will show that the V -algorithm gives a new method to
construct a mcst for every mcst situation and moreover, every mcst in a mcst situation can
be constructed by the V -algorithm.
Let Π(N) stand for the set of all bijections σ : N → N, where σ(i) = j means that
player j is in the i-th position with respect to σ.
7Let  V,EV ,w  be a mcst situation. Then the V -algorithm for mcst situations is deﬁned
as follows:
(Step 1) Pick σ ∈ Π(N) .
(Step 2) Set V 0
i = {i} for each i ∈ V and set Γσ,0 = ∅.
(Step 3) For k = 1 to n:
• Choose an edge eσ(k) = {uσ(k),vσ(k)} with uσ(k) ∈ V k−1
σ(k), vσ(k) ∈ V \ V k−1
σ(k) and
w(eσ(k)) ≤ w({u′,v′}) for all {u′,v′} ∈ EV with u′ ∈ V k−1
σ(k), v′ ∈ V \ V k−1
σ(k).
• For all j ∈ V k−1
vσ(k) and for all i ∈ V k−1
σ(k): Set V k
i = V k
j = V k−1
σ(k) ∪ V k−1
vσ(k).
• For all j ∈ V \
 
V k−1
vσ(k) ∪ V k−1
σ(k)
 
: Set V k
j = V k−1
j .
• Set Γσ,k = Γσ,k−1 ∪ {eσ(k)}.
(Step 4) Set Γσ =  V,Γσ,n  and vσ = (w(ei))n
i=1.
Example 3.1 Consider the mcst situation  V,EV ,w  with V = {0,1,2,3} and w as de-
picted in Figure 1.
Let σ ∈ Π(N) be such that σ(i) = i for every i ∈ N. The related V -algorithm is de-
scribed as follows:
(Step 1) Let σ ∈ Π(N) be such that σ(i) = i for every i ∈ N.
(Step 2) V 0
i = {i} for every i ∈ V and Γσ,0 = ∅.
(Step 3) Step 3 consists of the following three iterations:
• k = 1: σ(1) = 1 and V 0
1 = {1}. Then, e1 = {1,2}; V 1
1 = V 1
2 = {1,2}; Γσ,1 = {{1,2}}.
V 1
0 = V 0
0 and V 1
3 = V 0
3 .
• k = 2: σ(2) = 2 and V 1
2 = {1,2}. Then, e2 = {1,3}; V 2
1 = V 2
2 = V 2
3 = {1,2,3};
Γσ,2 = {{1,2},{1,3}}. V 2
0 = V 1
0 .
• k = 3: σ(3) = 3 and V 2
3 = {1,2,3}. Then, e3 = {0,1}; V 3
1 = V 3
2 = V 3
3 = V 3
0 =
{0,1,2,3}; Γσ,3 = {{1,2},{1,3},{0,1}}.
(Step 4) Γσ =  V,Γσ,3  and vσ = (40,60,90). ⋄
We start our analysis of the V -algorithm with the following two preliminary results:
(i) The V -algorithm generates an eﬃcient solution for mcst problems, i.e., it provides a
mcst for every mcst situation.
(ii) Every mcst can be constructed by the V -algorithm.
Theorem 3.1 For every mcst situation  V,EV ,w  ∈ WV and permutation on the set of
players, σ ∈ Π(N), the V -algorithm results in a mcst Γσ =  V,Γσ,n  of  V,EV ,w .
8Proof. Pick  V,EV ,w  ∈ WV and σ ∈ Π(N). We will prove that Γσ =  V,Γσ,n  as obtained
in Step 4 of the V -algorithm is a mcst of  V,EV  . It’s obvious that Γσ has n edges and
does not contain any cycle. Hence, it immediately follows from result (1) of Theorem 2.1
that Γσ is a spanning tree of  V,EV  . It remains to show that Γσ is of minimal weight.
We will prove this by induction: Assume that there exists a mcst Γk of  V,EV   which
contains Γσ,k for every k ∈ {1,2,...,m − 1} (m ∈ {2,...,n}). First, let’s show that the








. Suppose not. Notice ﬁrst that V 0
σ(1) = {σ(1)}. Pick a mcst Γ
of  V,EV  . Then Γ contains a path PΓ(eσ(1)) which connects uσ(1) and vσ(1). Then, by
result (2) of Theorem 2.1, w(e) ≤ w(eσ(1)) for every e ∈ PΓ(eσ(1)). However, there exists
an edge {σ(1), ˜ v} ∈ PΓ(eσ(1)) for some ˜ v ∈ V \ {σ(1)} and w({σ(1), ˜ v}) ≥ w(eσ(1)) by the
selection of eσ(1) by the V -algorithm. But then Γ ∪ eσ(1) \ {σ(1), ˜ v} is again a mcst of G
which contains eσ(1), a contradiction.
Now, let eσ(m) = {uσ(m),vσ(m)} with uσ(m) ∈ V m−1
σ(m) be the edge that is constructed in the
mth step by the V -algorithm. If eσ(m) is contained in Γm−1, then we are done. Hence, assume
that eσ(m)  ∈ Γm−1. Then, Γm−1 contains the unique path P V,Γm−1 (eσ(m)). Obviously,
P V,Γm−1 (eσ(m)) has to contain another edge ˜ e = {˜ u, ˜ v} with ˜ u ∈ V m−1
σ(m) and ˜ v ∈ V \ V m−1
σ(m) .
Now, on the one hand, result (2) of Theorem 2.1 implies that w(eσ(m)) ≥ w(˜ e) while, on the
other hand, the choice of eσ(m) implies that w(eσ(m)) ≤ w(˜ e). Then, Γm = Γm−1 ∪em \ ˜ e is
a mcst of G which contains eσ(m). Hence, we can conclude that Γσ is a mcst of  V,EV  . ￿
Theorem 3.2 Let  V,EV ,w  be a mcst situation and Γ be a mcst of  V,EV  . Then Γ can
be constructed by the V -algorithm for any permutation σ ∈ Π(N).
Proof. Let Γ be a mcst of G and suppose that it can not be constructed by the V -algorithm
for σ ∈ Π(N). Starting with σ construct Γ by using the V -algorithm as far as possible.
Then, there exists k ∈ {1,...,n − 1} such that eσ(j) ∈ E(Γ) for every j ∈ {1,...,k} and
eσ(k+1) = {uσ(k+1),vσ(k+1)}  ∈ E(Γ). Then, there exists ˜ e = {˜ u, ˜ v} ∈ PΓ(eσ(k+1)) such
that ˜ u ∈ V k
σ(k+1) and ˜ v  ∈ V k
σ(k+1). Moreover, w(eσ(k+1)) < w(˜ e) by the choice of eσ(k+1).
Then,  V,E(Γ) ∪ eσ(k+1)\˜ e  is a spanning tree of G with total weight less than that of Γ, a
contradiction. ￿
4 The V-Value






for each w ∈ WV , where vσ is the allocation vector provided by the V -algorithm with
respect to σ ∈ Π(N). Our main result in this paper is the coincidence of the P-value with
the V -value. In order to present this result, we need the following two lemmas.
9Lemma 4.1 Let  V,EV ,w  be a mcst situation and σ ∈ Π(N). Let k ∈ {1,2,...,n} be such
that both V k−1
σ(k)\{σ(k)}  = ∅ and V \V k−1
σ(k)  = ∅. Let {u,v} ∈ EV with u ∈ V k−1
σ(k)\{σ(k)} and
v ∈ V \V k−1
σ(k). Then, w({u,v}) ≥ w(e) for every e ∈ P V,Γσ,k−1  (σ(k),u).
Proof. Pick a mcst situation  V,EV ,w , σ ∈ Π(N) and k ∈ {1,2,...,n}. Assume that
both V k−1
σ(k)\{σ(k)}  = ∅ and V \V k−1
σ(k)  = ∅. Pick {u,v} ∈ EV with u ∈ V k−1
σ(k)\{σ(k)} and v ∈
V \V k−1
σ(k) . We will show that there exists t ∈ {1,2,...,k − 1} such that σ(t) ∈ V k−1
σ(k)\{σ(k)},
u ∈ V t−1
σ(t) , eσ(t) ∈ P V,Γσ,k−1 (σ(k),u) and hence, w(eσ(t)) ≤ w({u,v}).
Obviously, there exists ¯ t ∈ {1,2,...,k − 1} such that σ(¯ t) = u and we know that
u ∈ V
¯ t−1
σ(¯ t). Hence, if eσ(¯ t) ∈ P V,Γσ,k−1 (σ(k),u), then we are done. Assume that eσ(¯ t)  ∈
P V,Γσ,k−1 (σ(k),u).
We will show that there exists ˆ t ∈ {¯ t + 1,...,k − 1} 2 such that u = σ(¯ t) ∈ V
ˆ t−1
σ(ˆ t) and
eσ(ˆ t) ∈ P V,Γσ,k−1 ({σ(k),u}). Suppose not. Let’s denote the set
 
j ∈ V k−1
σ(k)|eσ(¯ t) ∈ P V,Γσ,k−1 (σ(k),j)
 
by C1.
We know that eσ(¯ t) = {uσ(¯ t),vσ(¯ t)} for some uσ(¯ t) ∈ V
¯ t−1
σ(¯ t), vσ(¯ t) ∈ V \V
¯ t−1
σ(¯ t) and eσ(¯ t)  ∈
P V,Γσ,k−1 (σ(k),u). Then obviously vσ(¯ t) ∈ C1 and hence, C1  = ∅. Clearly, there exists ˆ t1 ∈
{¯ t + 1,...,k − 1} such that σ(ˆ t1) ∈ C1 and u ∈ V
ˆ t1−1
σ(ˆ t1). Hence, if eσ(ˆ t1) ∈ P V,Γσ,k−1 (σ(k),u),







Figure 2: An auxiliary ﬁgure for the proof of Lemma 4.1
If eσ(ˆ t1)  ∈ P V,Γσ,k−1 (σ(k),u), then we can show by using a similar argument as above
that the set C2 =
 
j ∈ V k−1
σ(k)|eσ(ˆ t1) ∈ P V,Γσ,k−1 (σ(k),j)
 
 = ∅ and there exists ˆ t2 ∈ {ˆ t1 +
1,...,k − 1} such that σ(ˆ t2) ∈ C2 and u ∈ V
ˆ t2−1
σ(ˆ t2). Hence, if eσ(ˆ t2) ∈ P V,Γσ,k−1 ({σ(k),u}),
then we are done. But, if eσ(ˆ t2)  ∈ P V,Γσ,k−1 ({σ(k),u}), then, since EV is ﬁnite, by repeating
the argument above ﬁnitely many times, one reaches a ˆ t ∈ {¯ t+1,...,k−1} such that eσ(ˆ t) ∈
P V,Γσ,k−1 (σ(k),u) and u = σ(¯ t) ∈ Vσ(ˆ t). This proves that there exists t ∈ {1,...,k − 1}
such that σ(t) ∈ V k−1
σ(k)\{σ(k)}, u ∈ V t−1
σ(t) , eσ(t) ∈ P V,Γσ,k−1 (σ(k),u) and hence, w(eσ(t)) ≤
w({u,v}).
We know that eσ(t) = {uσ(t),vσ(t)} with uσ(t) ∈ V t−1
σ(t) and vσ(t) ∈ V \V t−1
σ(t) . Now we can
use the whole argument given above to show that there exists s ∈ {1,2,...,k −1} such that
σ(s) ∈ V k−1
σ(k) \{σ(k)}, vσ(t) ∈ V s−1
σ(s) and eσ(s) ∈ P V,Γσ,k−1 (σ(k),u)\{σ(t)}. Hence, if uσ(t)  ∈
V s−1
σ(s), then w(eσ(s)) ≤ w(eσ(t)) ≤ w({u,v}) by the selection of eσ(s) by the V -algorithm. On
2Notice that ¯ t ≤ k − 2 when eσ(¯ t)  ∈ P V,Γσ,k−1 (σ(k),u).
10the other hand, if uσ(t) ∈ V s−1
σ(s), then u ∈ V s−1
σ(s) and v  ∈ V s−1
σ(s). Hence w(eσ(s)) ≤ w({u,v})
by the selection of eσ(s). But, repeating this argument at most |E(P V,Γσ,k−1 (σ(k),u))|
times, we can conclude that w({u,v}) ≥ w(e) for every e ∈ P V,Γσ,k−1 (σ(k),u). ￿
In the following, we will denote  V,Fπ,t  by its edge set Fπ,t for every mcst situation
 V,EV ,w , π ∈ Π(EV ) and t ∈ {1,2,...,|EV |}. Moreover, for every σ ∈ Π(N), we say
that i ∈ N is the last agent in Ci(Fπ,t) with respect to σ, if σ−1(i) ≥ σ−1(j) for every
j ∈ V (Ci(Fπ,t)). Lastly, both the edge set and the vertex set of Ci(Fπ,t) are denoted by
Ci(Fπ,t) unless there is danger of confusion.
Lemma 4.2 Let  V,EV ,w  be a mcst situation. Let π ∈ Π(EV ) be such that w ∈ Kπ and
t ∈ {1,...,|EV | − 1} be such that w(π(t)) < w(π(t + 1)). Let σ ∈ Π(N). Then, for every
k ∈ {1,2,...,n}
1. eσ(k) ∈ Cσ(k)(Fπ,t) and hence, w(eσ(k)) ≤ w(π(t)) if σ(k) is not the last agent in
Cσ(k)(Fπ,t) with respect to σ or if 0 ∈ Cσ(k)(Fπ,t).
2. V k−1
σ(k) ⊃ Cσ(k)(Fπ,t); eσ(k)  ∈ Cσ(k)(Fπ,t) and hence, w(eσ(k)) > w(π(t)) if σ(k) is the
last agent in Cσ(k)(Fπ,t) with respect to σ and 0  ∈ Cσ(k)(Fπ,t).
Proof. Pick a mcst situation  V,EV ,w  and π ∈ Π(EV ) such that w ∈ Kπ. Assume that
there exists t ∈ {1,...,|EV | − 1} such that w(π(t)) < w(π(t + 1)). Pick σ ∈ Π(N). Assume
that the following induction hypothesis holds for all k ∈ {1,2,...,m − 1}(m ∈ {2,...,n}).
• If σ(k) is not the last player of Cσ(k)(Fπ,t) with respect to σ, then eσ(k) ∈ Cσ(k)(Fπ,t).
• If σ(k) is the last player of Cσ(k)(Fπ,t) with respect to σ and 0 ∈ Cσ(k)(Fπ,t), then
eσ(k) ∈ Cσ(k)(Fπ,t).
• If σ(k) is the last player of Cσ(k)(Fπ,t) with respect to σ, and 0  ∈ Cσ(k)(Fπ,t), then
eσ(k)  ∈ Cσ(k)(Fπ,t).
Let’s prove the basis step (k = 1). We know that V 0
σ(1) = {σ(1)}. Also, w({σ(1),v}) >
w(π(t)) for every {σ(1),v}  ∈ Cσ(1)(Fπ,t) and w({σ(1),v}) ≤ w(π(t)) for every {σ(1),v} ∈
Cσ(1)(Fπ,t). Assume ﬁrst that σ(1) is not the last player of Cσ(1)(Fπ,t) with respect to
σ. Then, E(Cσ(1)(Fπ,t))  = ∅ and obviously eσ(1) ∈ Cσ(1)(Fπ,t). Assume now that σ(1)
is the last player of Cσ(1)(Fπ,t) with respect to σ and 0 ∈ Cσ(1)(Fπ,t). Then, obviously,
E(Cσ(1)(Fπ,t)) = {{0,σ(1)}} and hence, eσ(1) = {0,σ(1)}. Assume lastly that σ(1) is
the last player of Cσ(1)(Fπ,t) with respect to σ and 0  ∈ Cσ(1)(Fπ,t). Then, obviously
E(Cσ(1)(Fπ,t)) = ∅. Hence eσ(1)  ∈ E(Cσ(1)(Fπ,t)) and w(eσ(1)) > w(π(t)).
We will now show that the induction hypothesis is true for k=m. Firstly, observe that:
(i) For every {u,v} ∈ EV such that u ∈ Cσ(m)(Fπ,t) and v ∈ V \Cσ(m)(Fπ,t), w({u,v}) >
w(π(t)), because {u,v}  ∈ Fπ,t.
11(ii) If V m−1
σ(m) \Cσ(m)(Fπ,t)  = ∅, then w({u,v}) > w(π(t)) for every {u,v} ∈ EV with u ∈
V m−1
σ(m) \Cσ(m)(Fπ,t) and v ∈ V \V m−1
σ(m) , because there exists {u′,v′} ∈ P V,Γσ,m−1 (σ(m),u)
such that u′ ∈ Cσ(m)(Fπ,t) and v′  ∈ Cσ(m)(Fπ,t). And by (i) w({u′,v′}) > w(π(t)). Then,
by Lemma 4.1, w({u,v}) ≥ w({u′,v′}) > w(π(t)).
Now, (i) in conjunction with (ii) implies that for every {u,v} ∈ EV with u ∈ V m−1
σ(m) and
v ∈ V \V m−1
σ(m) , w({u,v}) > w(π(t)) if either u  ∈ Cσ(m)(Fπ,t) or v  ∈ Cσ(m)(Fπ,t).
Consider the graph  V,Γσ,m−1 . Since  V,Γσ,m−1  does not contain any cycles, result (1)
of Theorem 2.1 implies that the restriction of  V,Γσ,m−1  to V (Cσ(m)(Fπ,t)) is connected if
and only if it has |V (Cσ(m)(Fπ,t))|−1 edges. Moreover, we know by the induction hypothesis
that eσ(k) ∈ Cσ(k)(Fπ,t) for every k ∈ {1,...,m − 1}. Hence, if σ(m) is not the last player
of Cσ(m)(Fπ,t) with respect to σ or 0 ∈ Cσ(m)(Fπ,t), then the restriction of  V,Γσ,m−1  to
V (Cσ(m)(Fπ,t)) has less than |V (Cσ(m)(Fπ,t))|−1 edges, and hence, it fails to be connected.
Thus, both V m−1
σ(m) ∩ Cσ(m)(Fπ,t)  = ∅ and (V \V m−1
σ(m) ) ∩ Cσ(m)(Fπ,t))  = ∅. Moreover, since
Cσ(m)(Fπ,t) is connected in  V,Fπ,t , there exists {u,v} ∈ E(Cσ(m)(Fπ,t)) such that u ∈
V m−1
σ(m) ∩Cσ(m)(Fπ,t) and v ∈ (V \V m−1
σ(m) )∩Cσ(m)(Fπ,t)). Therefore, eσ(m) ∈ Cσ(m)(Fπ,t) and
hence, w(eσ(m)) ≤ w(π(t)) if σ(m) is not the last player of Cσ(m)(Fπ,t) with respect to σ or
0 ∈ Cσ(m)(Fπ,t). This proves part (1) of Lemma 4.2.
If σ(m) is the last player of Cσ(m)(Fπ,t) with respect to σ and 0  ∈ Cσ(m)(Fπ,t), then the
restriction of  V,Γσ,m−1  to V (Cσ(m)(Fπ,t)) has |V (Cσ(m)(Fπ,t))| − 1 edges, and hence, it
is connected. But, then V m−1
σ(m) ⊃ Cσ(m)(Fπ,t). Hence eσ(m)  ∈ Cσ(m)(Fπ,t) and w(eσ(m)) >
w(π(t)). This proves part (2) of Lemma 4.2. ￿
We are now ready to prove the equivalence of the P-value and the V -value.
Theorem 4.1 v(w) = P(w) for every mcst situation w ∈ WV .
Proof. First recall that the allocation of the cost of a single edge by the P-value may
change with respect to the order of the edges under consideration. But, the allocation of
the cost of the edges with same cost is the same regardless of the order considered. Hence,
we will show below that the allocation of the cost of the edges with the same cost by the
P-value and by the V -value are equal to each other.
Pick an mcst situation  V,EV ,w  and a ∈ ∪e∈EV {w(e)}.
Let Ea = {e ∈ EV |w(e) = a}. Assume that |Ea| = m for some m ∈ {1,2,...,|EV |} and
|{w ∈ EV |w(e) < a}| = t for some t ∈ {0,1,...,|EV | − m}. In the following we say that




to agent i for the construction of the edges in Ea, if i
chooses to construct an edge from Ea at k (k ∈ {0,1,...,n!}) of the n! orders on the set of
players during the V -algorithm.
Firstly, for all π ∈ Π(EV ) such that w ∈ Kπ, the Pπ-value (and hence the P-value)




t+kMπet+k = a(bπ,t − bπ,t+m), (6)
12where the equality is implied by equation (3) of Lemma 2.1. Notice that bπ,t = bπ′,t (bπ,t+m =
bπ′,t+m), since  V,Fπ,t  =  V,Fπ′,t  ( V,Fπ,t+m  =  V,Fπ′,t+m ) for every π,π′ ∈ Π(EV )
such that w ∈ Kπ and w ∈ Kπ′
. Hence, for every π ∈ Π(EV ) with w ∈ Kπ, we will denote
Fπ,t as Ft, Fπ,t+m as Ft+m, bπ,t as bt and bπ,t+m as bt+m. Moreover,  V,Ft  and  V,Ft+m 
will simply be denoted with their sets of edges, Ft and Ft+m, respectively.
Pick an agent i ∈ N. We will show by considering several cases that the allocation of
the cost of the edges in Ea to i is done in the same way by the P-value and by the V -value.
Firstly, if 0 ∈ Ci(Ft), then clearly both bt
i = bt+m
i = 0. Also part (1) of Lemma 4.2
implies that vσ
i < a for every σ ∈ Π(N). Then, both the V -value and the P-value assign 0
to i for the cost of construction of the edges in Ea. Hence, in the following, we will assume
that 0  ∈ Ci(Ft).
Case 1: Ci(Ft+m) = Ci(Ft). Then, clearly, ni(Ft) = ni(Ft+m) and hence, bt
i − bt+m
i =
0. So, by (6) the P-value does not allocate any cost to i for the construction of edges in
Ea. Let’s now consider the V -value.
We know by part (1) of Lemma 4.2 that vσ
i < a for every σ ∈ Π(N) such that i is
not the last player of Ci(Ft) with respect to σ. We will now show that vσ
i  = a for every
σ ∈ Π(N) such that i is the last player of Ci(Ft) with respect to σ, too. Suppose on the
contrary that there exists σ ∈ Π(N) such that i is the last player of Ci(Ft) with respect to
σ and vσ
i = a, i.e., there exists {u,v} ∈ Ea such that u ∈ V
σ−1(i)−1
i , v ∈ V \V
σ−1(i)−1
i and
w({u,v}) ≤ w({u′,v′}) for every {u′,v′} ∈ EV with u′ ∈ V
σ−1(i)−1
i and v′ ∈ V \V
σ−1(i)−1
i .
Since Ci(Ft+m) = Ci(Ft), there are two possibilities regarding the edge {u,v}. Either
both u,v ∈ Ci(Ft) or both u,v  ∈ Ci(Ft). Assume ﬁrst that both u,v ∈ Ci(Ft). We
know by part (2) of Lemma 4.2 that V
σ−1(i)−1
i ⊃ Ci(Ft). Hence, both u,v ∈ Ci(Ft) ⊂
V
σ−1(i)−1
i contradicting that v ∈ V \V
σ−1(i)−1
i . Now, assume that both u,v  ∈ Ci(Ft).
Then, Lemma 4.1 implies that w({u,v}) ≥ w(e) for every e ∈ P V,Γσ,σ−1(i)−1  (i,u). But
since u  ∈ Ci(Ft) = Ci(Ft+m), there exists e ∈ P V,Γσ,σ−1(i)−1  (i,u) such that e  ∈  V,Ft+m .
Then w(e) > a = w({u,v}), a contradiction. Thus, vσ
i > a for every σ ∈ Π(N) such that
i is the last player of Ci(Ft) with respect to σ. Hence, we can conclude that the V -value
does not allocate any cost to i for the construction of edges in Ea, too.
Case 2: Ci(Ft+m)  = Ci(Ft). Then, there exists i = i1,i2,...,ik (2 ≤ k ≤ m + 1) such
that is ∈ N for every s ∈ {1,...,k}, Cis(Ft)  = Cir(Ft) for every r,s ∈ {1,...,k} with r  = s
and ∪k
s=1Cis(Ft) = Ci(Ft+m).
Case 2.1: 0 ∈ Ci(Ft+m). Then bt
i = 1
|V (Ci(F t))|; bt+m




|V (Ci(F t))|. Then by (6), i pays a
|V (Ci(F t))| for the construction of the edges in Ea with respect
to the P-value. On the other hand, we know by part (1) of Lemma 4.2 that vσ
i < a for every
σ ∈ Π(N) such that i is not the last player of Ci(Ft) with respect to σ. Moreover, again by
part (1) of Lemma 4.2, we know that vσ
j ≤ a for every j ∈ Ci(Ft+m) and σ ∈ Π(N). Then,
vσ
i = a for every σ ∈ Π(N) such that i is the last player of Ci(Ft) with respect to σ. Since,
i is the last player of Ci(Ft) with respect to σ for 1
|V (Ci(F t))|n! orders on the set of players,
i pays a
|V (Ci(F t))| for the construction of the edges in Ea with respect to the V -value.
13Case 2.2: 0  ∈ Ci(Ft+m). Then by (6) P-value allocates to i
a(bt
i − bt+m














On the other hand, we know by part (1) of Lemma 4.2 that vσ
i < a for every σ ∈ Π(N)
such that i is not the last player of Ci(Ft) with respect to σ. Moreover, we know by part (2)
of Lemma 4.2 that vσ
i > a when i is the last player of Ci(Ft+m) with respect to σ ∈ Π(N).
Then vσ
i = a when i is the last player of Ci(Ft) but a player from another component is the
last player of Ci(Ft+m). There are
 
|V (Ci(F t+m))|−|V (Ci(F t))|
|V (Ci(F t+m))| n!
 
orders such that a player
from another component is the last player of Ci(Ft+m). In 1
|V (Ci(F t))| of these orders i is





   









which is equivalent to (7).
Lastly, observe that both a ∈ ∪e∈EV {w(e)} and i ∈ N are random, hence, we can
conclude that v(w) = P(w). ￿
Remark 1: Norde et al. (2004) introduce the Pτ-values for mcst situations for every
ordering τ of the players. Pτ-values are also construct and charge rules which rely on the
Kruskal algorithm and it is shown in Tijs et al. (2006) that the average of the Pτ-values
over the set of all orderings of players is equal to the P-value. Actually, the cost allocation
vσ is equal to P ¯ σ, where ¯ σ stands for the reverse ordering of σ. This can be shown by
constructing a proof which is similar to the proof of Theorem 4.1. Hence, we preferred a
direct proof of the coincidence of the P-value and the V -value.
Remark 2: Berganti˜ nos and Vidal-Puga (2007) associate an optimistic transferable
utility game with mcst problems where the worth of a coalition is deﬁned as the cost of
connection, assuming that the rest of the agents are already connected to the source. They
show that the Shapley value of this game is equal to the P-value. One can show easily
that, for every ordering σ of the players, the vσ value is equal to the marginal of the game
associated by Berganti˜ nos and Vidal-Puga (2007) to mcst problems for the same ordering.
Hence, the coincidence of the V -value and the P-value can be proved by making use of
the result regarding the coincidence of the Shapley value and the P-value in the game
associated by Berganti˜ nos and Vidal-Puga (2007). However, we believe that our eﬀort for
establishing a graph theoretical proof for the coincidence of the P-value and the V -value is
worthwhile, because the V -algorithm can be extended easily to generalizations of the mcst
problems and one can easily extend our graph theoretical proof for such situations. For
example, in a companion study, we consider the extensions of the V -algorithm for mcst
14problems involving multiple sources and show, by extending the proofs in this paper, that
the V -value coincides with the extended P-value for the mcst situations considered.
5 Conclusions
The literature on mcst problems have provided many construct and charge rules. These rules
rely on the two well-known algorithms: the Kruskal algorithm and the Prim algorithm. The
P-value is one such construct and charge rule which relies on the Kruskal algorithm. It has
been shown that the P-value satisﬁes many desirable properties including core selectivity,
equal treatment of equals, (strong) cost monotonicity and population monotonicity. For an
overview of the interesting properties of the P-value, we refer to Berganti˜ nos and Vidal-
Puga (2005). In this study, we have shown that this important rule can be achieved by
following a vertex oriented procedure which also determines a mcst in a new way. That is,
we have shown that the P-value can be obtained as an average of the players’ own choices
in the vertex oriented algorithm.
Finally, we want to remark that Berganti˜ nos and Vidal-Puga (2005) deﬁne a construct
and charge procedure which is similar to the vertex oriented construct and charge procedure:
The procedure they deﬁne is also dependent on the orderings of the players and in the
procedure, each player pays the cost of the edge she preferred to construct. But, contrary
to the vertex oriented construct and charge procedure, it only works on mcst problems
with irreducible cost matrices, i.e., their procedure may not be eﬃcient if the cost matrix
of the mcst situation under investigation is not irreducible. If the procedure is applied
to the associated irreducible cost matrix of a mcst situation, then the average of the cost
allocations obtained over the set of orderings of the players is equal to the P-value.
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